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COMMENTARY
Toward a cultural psychology of
collective action: Just how “core” are
the core motivations for collective
action?
Martijn van Zomeren
Heymans Research Institute, University of Groningen, the Netherlands
I review the interesting contributions to this special thematic section in light of what has been referred toas the four core motivations for collective action (i.e. moral conviction, and group identification, anger
and efficacy beliefs). Specifically, I relate the key findings and insights from these articles — based on
intriguing data from participant samples in the Philippines, Japan, Indonesia and China — to these core
motivations for collective action, after which I raise the question of just how “core” these motivations are,
with an eye to an abundance of cultural variance. I answer this question by suggesting a number of
conceptual bridges to move the field forward toward a proper cultural psychology of collective action.
Such a cultural psychology, in my view, does justice not only to the notion of core motivations for collective
action but also to the abundance of cultural variance. Specifically, I suggest to think about culture in
terms of guiding when collective action is more or less likely to occur, within which the core motivations
reflect the psychological processes that facilitate it.
Keywords: collective action, culture, core motivations, identity, anger, efficacy, moral conviction
This special thematic section of the Journal of Pacific Rim
Psychology includes a number of fascinating articles across
a variety of topics, contexts and populations (e.g. with
participant samples from the Philippines, Japan, Indone-
sia and China), which are all focused on collective action
(i.e. any action that individuals engage in to achieve group
goals; Van Zomeren, 2016b). In this article, I review the
key findings and insights from these three articles and re-
late them to what has been referred to as the four core
motivations for collective action (i.e. moral conviction,
and group identification, anger and efficacy beliefs; Van
Zomeren, 2013). The key question I then raise is: Just how
“core” are these core motivations for collective action, in
light of abundant cultural variance?
My answer is that the core motivations seem relevant
for predicting collective action across the globe, but also
that it would help our field tremendously if the psychol-
ogy of collective action took culture more seriously (Van
Zomeren & Louis, 2018). One way to do this is to con-
ceive of culture as psychology much more than as geogra-
phy, which facilitates its integration with the psychology
of collective action. Indeed, culture is about shared ideas
of what is valid and valuable in the world (Smith, Fischer,
Author for correspondence: Martijn van Zomeren, Email: m.van.zomeren@rug.nl
Vignoles, & Bond, 2013) and hence concerns the priorities
of individuals as well as collectives (Markus & Kitayama,
1991, 2010; Schwartz, 1992); and, by implication, the col-
lective actions individuals undertake through these four
coremotivations. The challenge for the future is to develop
this major bridge, and to this end I will offer a number of
suggestions in this article.
Specifically, the notion of core motivations describes
the psychological processes through which people partic-
ipate in collective action, but this does not tell us when
such motivations will be psychologically relevant. This is
precisely what I believe a proper cultural psychology of
collective action will help us to understand better (i.e.
when collective action is more or less likely to occur
in the first place). As such, comparisons between cul-
tural contexts reflect much more than just whether a
particular finding “replicates” in a different context —
culture is more than just an empirical comparison. To
this end, I think the contributions to this special sec-
tion help us see the need for broader theoretical inte-
gration in this field, and to build a major bridge be-
tween cultural psychology and the psychology of collective
action.
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Findings and insights from the
contributions to this special thematic
section
The psychology of collective action (e.g. Klandermans,
1997; Van Zomeren, 2013; Van Zomeren, Postmes, &
Spears, 2008; see alsoBecker&Tausch, 2015; Thomas,Ma-
vor, & McGarty, 2012; Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans,
& Van Dijk, 2009) has identified four core motivations
for collective action: Individuals’ group identification (e.g.
with a labor union), their group-based anger (e.g. about
measures taken by the government), their group efficacy
beliefs (e.g. the belief that together union members can
change these measures through joint action), and their
moral convictions (e.g. that these measures violate indi-
viduals’ core values). This does not mean that all four
motivations always predict individuals’ collective action
for anyone in any collective action context, but across the
board, research typically finds positive, medium-sized ef-
fects of these predictors in studies of collective action (for
a meta-analysis, see Van Zomeren et al., 2008). This is in
part, however, because collective action research typically
already focuses on the relevant group identity within a
specific collective action context (e.g. a social movement
trying to mobilize people), which facilitates that it typ-
ically finds that group identification predicts collective
action (but see Van Zomeren, Susilani, & Berend, 2016).
However, the core motivations should also be under-
stood as context sensitive to the extent that, for example,
not all groups will be psychologically relevant in a given
context, or not all contexts will feature the same moral-
ized issues that play into people’s moral convictions (e.g.
some may moralize equality issues, whereas others mor-
alize loyalty issues). Gender, for instance, may mean very
different things depending on cultural context, and hence
gender identification can serve as amobilizer in some con-
texts (e.g. where gender inequality is widely perceived as
immoral), but as a pacifier or harmonizer in other con-
texts (e.g. where gender inequality is widely legitimized
and accepted). Keeping this in mind, the core motivations
then reflect a basic motivational potential that needs to be
unlocked by contextual conditions, such as provided by
political and cultural systems (Van Zomeren, 2016b).
Therefore, tounderstandcollective actionwithin a spe-
cific context, we need to understand, for example, what
the relevant group identity is, or which issues are moralized
within that context. This is precisely the point where cul-
ture, defined psychologically as shared ideas about what is
valid and valuable in the world, becomes important and
consequential for the psychology of collective action. For
instance, culture guides which, and to what extent, certain
groups are psychologically relevant and what they mean
(e.g. Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010). Furthermore, cul-
ture guides what is moral and hence which issues can
be moralized (e.g. Schwartz, 1992), which emotions can
be experienced and expressed (e.g. Markus & Kitayama,
1991), and whether collectives are likely to change the
broader political or cultural system (e.g. Van Zomeren,
2016a, 2016b). Before I discuss this further, let me re-
view the three contributions to the special section, with
an eye to core motivations for collective action in cultural
contexts of Japan, China, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
Moral conviction and group identification
The article by Wibisono et al. (this issue) is a good exam-
ple of the cultural meaning of different group identities.
Specifically, this focuses on the experience and meaning
of individuals’ religious and national identity in the cul-
tural context of Indonesia, where religion and nation-
ality often work together, such as when groups seek to
strengthen religious education in schools. Wibisono et al.
found in a survey study among 178 Indonesians that re-
ligious fundamentalism is a better predictor of religious
identity than national identity, which are positively corre-
lated. They also found through interviewing 35 members
ofmore and less fundamentalistmovements that those ac-
tivists with stronger religious fundamentalism prioritized
religious over national identity when they viewed them
as incompatible on important issues; but that those ac-
tivists with weaker religious fundamentalism were able to
integrate the two identities more. As such, although both
groups of activists presumably want to engage in collective
action, they do so on a different basis in terms of identity,
as differentially defined by religious fundamentalism.
Intriguingly, the notion of religious fundamentalism
comes close to the notion ofmoral conviction—one of the
four coremotivations for collective action—as this entails
the notion that one’s attitudes are connected to one’s core
values and experienced as factually true, and hence are
not open for debate or compromise (e.g. Skitka, 2010).
Indeed, given the presumed categorical nature of group
membership, moral convictions offer very clear bound-
aries of who is in the group and who is out, and thus
are very clear definers of a group identity (e.g. McGarty,
Bliuc, Thomas, & Bongiorno, 2009). In this sense, it is
interesting to see that those who presumably define their
identity through such religious convictions cannot easily
integrate their national identity in cases where there is po-
tential clash (e.g. legalizationof sharia). They arewhat they
stand for, which makes them ready for action to defend
any perceived threat to those convictions (for a review, see
Van Zomeren, Kutlaca, &Turner-Zwinkels, 2018).
Moreover, it is at least equally interesting to see that
such a fundamentalist approach to identity does not ap-
pear to be required for collective action— themoremod-
erate activists clearly indicated a more integrated identity
(in terms of religion and nationality) onwhich to act. This
fits with the broader idea that it is important to under-
stand what the relevant group identity is (and for whom)
in a specific context, and that moral convictions may not
be required for collective action— that is, strong, action-
oriented group identities can exist without moral convic-
tions that reduce the former to the latter. Future research
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can help us understand such different ways of group iden-
tity formation that nevertheless lead to activism in either
case.
Group-based anger and efficacy beliefs
Another core motivation for collective action is group-
based anger about perceived unfairness, typically directed
towards those perceived to be responsible for it (Lazarus,
1991). The second article by Li et al. (this issue) focused on
Chinese individuals’ anger among thosehigheror loweron
the social ladder (i.e. social class), definedas an individual’s
objective and/or subjective position in society and access
to resources. Across two (correlational and experimental)
studies, anger predicted collective action among their, in
total, 218Chinese participants—but only for those higher
in social class.
Given the broad empirical support for anger’s action-
oriented implications (see Van Zomeren, 2013), the key
question is why those lower in social class showed no, or
less of an effect in these studies. The authors’ argument
revolves around individuals’ perceptions of control, influ-
ence and efficacy that may be lacking among those lower
in social class. Unfortunately, however, this explanation
was not tested, and hence could not be confirmed em-
pirically. I agree with the authors that we therefore need
more research to understand what it is about lower social
class that wouldmake group-based anger less of a relevant
motivation for collective action.
This finding actually relates nicely to another coremo-
tivation for collective action— group efficacy beliefs. Such
beliefs pertain to whether individuals believe that the rel-
evant group can achieve its goals through joint action
(e.g. Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, &Mielke, 1999; see also
Bandura, 1997). Perhaps, as the authors also speculate in
the discussion section of the paper, those lower in social
class had lower group efficacy beliefs. A core motivation
approach, however, suggests alternative explanations. For
example, perhaps individuals did not perceive a relevant
group in this context, and hence did not feel anger on
behalf of this group. Perhaps those from lower social class
moralize different issues (e.g. Haidt, Koller, &Dias, 1993),
and hence draw different group identity boundaries based
on those (Van Zomeren et al., 2018). Future research can
test such possibilities.
The final contribution to the special section by Ochoa
et al. (this issue) actually tests a model based on all four
core motivations (i.e. the extended Social Identity Model
of Collective Action, or SIMCA for short; Van Zomeren,
2013, 2016b) among male students from Japan and the
Philippines, revolving around the issue of gender inequal-
ity in these countries. In total, 131 Philippine and 103
Japanese males were surveyed, which makes the type of
collective action here one of “allied” collective action. In-
terestingly, the predicted relationships between the core
motivations and collective action, as indicated in the zero-
order correlations between the key variables,were all in the
predicted direction and statistically signifcant; yet identi-
fication with men did not consistently correlate with col-
lective action and the coremotivations, which thus did not
appear to be such a relevant group identity across these
two cultural contexts; and that a regression model testing
the SIMCA — although with, as the authors admit, rela-
tively small samples — generally showed support for the
model.
It is important to note that all participants were male
and collective action was geared toward gender inequality
— in fact, this is why the authors included measures of
another potentially relevant group identity in this con-
text: that of men (rather than women). Although support
for this idea was not consistent and only visible to some
extent in the Japanese sample, the findings for identifi-
cation with women (i.e. the disadvantaged group in this
context) were consistent and in line with the SIMCA. It
thus seems that the core motivations for collective action
can even be found among those who are objectively part
of the advantaged group, but psychologically identify or
sympathize with the disadvantaged group. This is an in-
teresting finding that confirms and stretches the scope of
the SIMCA, as has also been observed in other work (e.g.
Cakal, Hewstone, Schwar, & Heath, 2011; Klavina & Van
Zomeren, in press).
Summary
The three articles in this special thematic section offer
intriguing tests of different core motivations for collec-
tive action in cultural contexts that are typically not the
mainstream’s focus; moreover, the studies are based on
samples of participants from Japan, China, Indonesia and
thePhilippines,which are typically not among the popula-
tions studied in mainstream psychology (Henrich, Heine,
& Norenzayan, 2010). For this reason, they offer a fair
contribution to the field in terms of researching collective
action from a cultural perspective, which highlights the
fascinating diversity (of topics, contexts, and populations)
in the current era of theory and research on collective ac-
tion,while at the same time solidifying anunderlying set of
core motivations that seem to be psychologically relevant
to collective action across the globe.
Just how “core” are the core motivations
for collective action?
One way to think about what is “core”, “fundamental”, or
“universal” even, is to establish a phenomenon without
finding much variance across very different cultural con-
text andpopulations (e.g.Norenzayan&Heine, 2005). For
example, the need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995;
see also Ainsworth, 1989; Batson, 1990; Bowlby, 1969; Ca-
cioppo & Patrick, 2008; Fiske, 1992; Van Zomeren, 2016a)
may be considered a “universal” because for most people,
most of the time, belongingness matters and is expressed
in social interactions with other people within the so-
cial networks that they are embedded in. In the context
JOURNAL OF PACIFIC RIM PSYCHOLOGY 3
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of collective action, “core” motivations should thus re-
flect predictors of collective action across very different
cultural contexts and populations — that is, they should
matter for most people, most of the time. For three of
the core motivations (group identification, anger, and ef-
ficacy), meta-analytic evidence seems to support this line
of thought (Van Zomeren et al., 2008), and from different
reviews we can infer that this may very well be the case for
moral conviction too (Skitka, 2010; Van Zomeren et al.,
2018).
However, it would be a mistake to conclude from this
observation that culture just provides “different contexts”
inwhich to “replicate” such findings—as noted, culture is
more than an empirical comparison. Unfortunately, this is
precisely how culture is often perceived in psychology —
as geography rather than as psychology. A proper cultural
psychology of collective action, however, defines culture
as shared ideas about what is valid and valuable in indi-
viduals’ social world, which enables us to connect it to the
psychology of collective action (Smith et al., 2013; Van
Zomeren, 2016a).
Building this connection would promote understand-
ing of, for example, how cultures prioritize different val-
ues, different ways to construe group identities, the emo-
tions to be experienced and expressed, and the belief in
agency to change the broader political or cultural system.
This is why I think that we may expect not too much
variance in the predictive power of the core motivations
themselves in contexts where they are psychologically rel-
evant, but we can expect enormous variance inwhen these
motivations are psychologically relevant for collective ac-
tion (VanZomeren, 2016a). Todevelop this line of thought
further, I propose a number of ideas revolving around the
four core motivations that may help us to move forward
toward a proper cultural psychology of collective action
that does justice to the core motivations as well as to
abundant cultural variance. The main idea is that culture
guideswhen collective action ismore or less likely to occur,
within which the coremotivations reflect the psychological
processes that facilitate it.
Moral conviction and group identification
Values are typically defined as psychological priorities peo-
ple hold, based on principles such as benevolence or hi-
erarchy. Indeed, much cross-cultural work has identified
meaningful differences between countries within which
people hold different values (Schwartz, 1992; see also
Fiske, 1992). Yet, of course, the variance within countries
is also considerable (Smith et al., 2013), as a country can
be a container of “culture”, but so can smaller commu-
nities, social networks, and organizations. This suggests
that cultural values, from the perspective within a specific
country, for example, are perceived as a default, or norm;
and that somepeople have internalized this normand thus
conform to it, whereas others may have not (e.g. Heu, Van
Zomeren, & Hansen, in press). In this framework, values
serve as general benchmarks for behavior, but may be in-
sufficiently specific to predict collective action within a
specific context.
This is exactly why moral convictions are more likely
to be predictive of collective action than more general
values: They are more specific and are clearly internal-
ized (Kutlaca, van Zomeren, & Epstude, in press; see also
Sabucedo, Dono, Alzate, & Seoane, 2018). Furthermore,
moral conviction comes along with a psychological ten-
dency of absolutism, which creates clear group bound-
aries and thus can forcefully define a group identity (Van
Zomeren, 2013). The key question, then, is which spe-
cific issues will become moralized (as indicated by moral
conviction) in different cultural contexts with different
values as defaults. Establishing this bridge between cul-
tural context (in terms of values as broad priorities and
benchmarks) and moral conviction on a specific issue as
a core motivation for collective action will help us un-
derstand how the former affords or inhibits the latter
and thus when collective action is more or less likely to
occur.
A second bridge can be established between cultural
context and group identification. The key idea here is
that culture guides which group identities are likely to
become psychologically relevant. The power of this core
motivation then comes from the observation that once
people identify with such a relevant group, they become
more likely to engage in collective action (Van Zomeren
et al., 2008). This suggestswefirst need tounderstandwhat
different cultures psychologically reflect in terms of group
identities — not just in terms of group identification, but
also in terms of their content or meaning.1
Against this backdrop, it is difficult to escape the no-
tion of individualism-collectivism (e.g. Oyserman, Coon,
& Kemmelmeier, 2002; see also Smith et al., 2013) as a
broad-stroke, cultural-psychological variable that may be
relevant to collective action. For instance, cross-cultural
variance implies that some countries will be more collec-
tivistic than others, and hence set different value priorities
for individuals in terms of group memberships (e.g. Heu
et al., in press). One way in which this materializes psy-
chologically is in how the self is construed: Individualists
tend to construe their self in more independent self-ways,
whereas collectivists tend to do this in more interdepen-
dent self-ways (e.g. Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010). One
consequence of this is a preference for social harmony
among those construing the self as interdependent, which
may not sit well with participating in collective action (as
a form of social conflict).
Indeed, collectivists should by definition prioritize the
groupmore than individualists; but, if part of collectivism
is a tendency toward interdependent self-construal and
a preference for harmony within the group, then collec-
tivists may, paradoxically, not be the most likely people to
participate in collective action. This is actually what we
may have found in previous research (Van Zomeren et al.,
2016) in Indonesia. In two surveys among Indonesian
4 JOURNAL OF PACIFIC RIM PSYCHOLOGY
. https://doi.org/10.1017/prp.2019.7
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Groningen, on 04 Jun 2019 at 10:11:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms
Toward a cultural psychology of collective action
ethnic minority group members, we examined the role of
group identification on collective action against discrim-
ination of ethnic minorities. Across the two studies, we
found that ethnic group identification did not predict col-
lective action in this context, despite generally high levels
of such identification. In fact, what we found was that
such identification was predicted by “seeking shelter” in
their network of social relationships (e.g. family, friends,
significant other), which did not motivate them to engage
in collective action — in that sense, this group identity
was clearly not the psychologically relevant one for col-
lective action, as it was defined by individuals’ network
of relationships that prioritized harmony over conflict.
Establishing a bridge between cultural context and group
identification therefore would help to understand how the
former affords or inhibits the latter, and thus collective ac-
tion is more or less likely to occur.
Group-based anger and efficacy beliefs
A third bridge concerns connecting cultural context with
emotions like group-based anger. One correlate of inter-
dependent self-construal is a norm that negative emotions
should not be expressed—people prioritize harmony and
do not want to “rock the boat”, or see the boat rocked by
others in the group (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010). As
a consequence, one could expect collectivists that construe
their self in interdependent terms to shy away from anger
in order to harmonize relationships within the group, and
hence we may not expect it to predict collective action in
such cultural contexts. In fact, this may be a partial ex-
planation of the findings by Li et al. (this issue) among
those from the lower social class in China. This assumes,
however, a more interdependent self-construal (or more
broad collectivist perspective) among those lower on the
social ladder (see Haidt et al., 1993).
An alternative suggestion would be to consider the un-
derlying cognitive appraisal of group-based anger,which is
the cognitive appraisal of group-based unfairness, caused
by another group or agent (Lazarus, 1991). In cultures
where power distance is higher, this typically means that
inequality is legitimized more easily, or that a clear per-
petrator is more difficult to identify (Van Zomeren et al.,
2016). When collective action seeks to contest social in-
equality, it should therefore be harder to mobilize indi-
viduals in such cultural contexts on the basis of anger (as
grounded in appraisals of unfairness of inequality, and
blaming a perpetrator). Nevertheless, if one would fo-
cus one’s research on those already seeing and contesting
that unfairness (as is often the case in collective action re-
search), onewould expect the effect of the coremotivation
of group-based anger on collective action. As such, under-
standing culture in a psychological way will enable us to
understand when the “right” conditions for collective ac-
tion are in place, which boils down to the conditions for
the core motivations of collective action to become psy-
chologically relevant (Van Zomeren, 2016b).
Finally, group efficacy beliefs relate to and contribute
to the broader notion of collective agency to change the
social structure. Indeed, if culture shapes which values
and group identities are psychologically relevant for indi-
viduals in the first place, and how perceptions of group-
based unfairness and emotions like group-based anger can
be experienced, then it may also powerfully shape how
much individuals believe that “we” can influence “our”
social world through joint effort. For example, in cul-
tural contexts where gender means something immutable
(e.g. women are subordinate to men), then such a group
identitymight be psychologically important to individuals
(e.g. for well-being), but may not be relevant for collective
action — and one reason for that may be that people do
not feel like they can change anything together in the first
place (Bandura, 1997; Mummendey et al., 1999).
Some recent work suggests that one important condi-
tion for group efficacy beliefs to predict collective action is
indeed that people can at least see and emotionally experi-
ence themere possibility for change— that is, they need to
experience hope (Cohen-Chen&VanZomeren, 2018). In-
deed, Cohen-Chen andVan Zomeren (2018) found across
a number of studies that the predictive power of group ef-
ficacy beliefs depends on having at least some hope for
social change. This notion of perceiving possibility for so-
cial changemay be important to examine cross-culturally:
In which cultural contexts can we expect more hope for
social change, and by extension a stronger potential for
group efficacy beliefs to predict collective action?
One answer may come from the notion of system jus-
tification — a need that individuals are assumed to have
(together with a need for ego and group justification) to
maintain and protect the (what I would define as politi-
cal or cultural) system in which they live (e.g. Osborne,
Jost, Becker, Badaan, & Sibley, in press). Although system
justification tends to be conceptualized as an implicit psy-
chological mechanism (e.g. Osborne et al., in press), one
canalso viewadefault level of system justificationas an im-
portantmarker of culture, at leastwith respect to collective
action. Indeed, if a cultural context prioritizes protecting
the system over the group and the individual, then condi-
tions will not be favorable for collective action (unless it
is to protect the system; Osborne et al., in press); hence,
the core motivations may not be psychologically relevant.
Indeed, individuals’ convictions should then likely revolve
around the system’s values, whichwould be about protect-
ing, rather than changing, the system, and hence group
identities relevant to social change will be difficult to form
andmaintain, group-based anger will be difficult to expe-
rience, group efficacy beliefs to achieve social change will
be difficult to find, and as a consequence, collective action
wouldbeunlikely tomaterialize. This illustrates nicelywhy
I believe that bridging cultural psychology with the psy-
chology of collective action will help us better understand
when the former affords or inhibits the latter, whereas the
core motivations help us understand which psychological
processes are most relevant.
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Summary
I have offered a number of ways to bridge a psychologi-
cal notion of culture with the four core motivations for
collective action. In doing so, it becomes clear that cul-
tural context seems particularly important in addressing
when collective action is more or less likely to occur,
whereas the core motivations address which psycholog-
ical processes facilitate this. For this reason, I believe we
need to start integrating cultural-psychological variables
into theory and research on collective action, such as in-
dividualism (Triandis, 1995), self-construal (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991, 2010), values (Schwartz, 1992), and, al-
though typically not interpreted in cultural-psychological
terms, system justification (Osborne et al., in press).Doing
so would enable our theories, models and studies to take
the abundance of cultural variance seriously, while solidi-
fying the core motivations of collective action. Moreover,
doing so would reflect a move toward a proper cultural
psychology of collective action that does justice to the
core motivations as well as to an abundance of cultural
variance.
Conclusion
I have reviewed anddiscussed the key findings and insights
from the three intriguing contributions to this special the-
matic section, based on data from Japan, China, Indonesia
and the Philippines. Through a focus on the core moti-
vations for collective action, I raised the questions about
just how “core” these motivations are and what a proper
cultural psychology of collective action should look like.
I answered them by outlining a number of suggestions
for connecting cultural-psychological variables to the core
motivations of collective action, so as to do justice to both
cultural variance and core motivations. Building such a
major bridge will benefit the field and generate theory
and research on collective action that takes culture more
seriously than is currently the case — that is, as cultural
psychology rather than geography.
My view is that taking this direction will likely lead
us to conclude that the core motivations for collective
action are “core” to the extent that they will predict col-
lective action for most people, most of the time — but
only when the cultural context makes psychologically rel-
evant the moral convictions, group identities, feelings of
anger and beliefs about the group’s efficacy that motivate
people to engage in collective action. A proper cultural
psychology of collective action will therefore be able to
offer a much more comprehensive psychological account
of when collective action is more or less likely to happen
in the first place, and how this materializes (through the
psychological processes reflected in the four core motiva-
tions). Compared to the state of our current psychology
of collective action, building this major bridge would be a
major step forward for the field. I look forward to building
this bridge collectively.
Endnote
1 Otherwork has alreadymoved somewhat into this direction.
For instance, Turner-Zwinkels, Van Zomeren, and Postmes
(2015, 2018)havedeveloped anon-reactivemeasure of iden-
tity content, which allows us insights into what it means
when people self-report that they identify strongly with a
group in the context of collective action. This work found,
for instance, that when people politicize over time (i.e. in the
context of a political campaign), their personal and political
identity content converge;moreover, people usemoremoral
terms to define themselves. These findings fit with the idea
that moral convictions can powerfully shape group identi-
ties, and that the notion of morality more broadly seems
key to understanding this (Van Zomeren et al., 2018). In
this sense, understanding what the default value priorities
are within a culture—with an eye to bothmoral conviction
and group identification — seems absolutely pivotal.
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